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Electronic health records and the need for 
de-identification
Electronic health records (EHRs) are increasingly being 
used  as  a  source  of  clinically  relevant  patient  data  for 
research [1,2], including genome-wide association studies 
[3].  Often,  research  ethics  boards  will  not  allow  data 
custodians  to  disclose  identifiable  health  information 
without patient consent. However, obtaining consent can 
be challenging and there have been major concerns about 
the negative impact of obtaining patient consent on the 
ability  to  conduct  research  [4].  Such  concerns  are  re-
inforced  by  the  compelling  evidence  that  requiring 
explicit  consent  for  participation  in  different  forms  of 
health research can have a negative impact on the process 
and outcomes of the research itself [5-7]. For example, 
recruitment rates decline significantly when individuals 
are  asked  to  consent;  those  who  consent  tend  to  be 
different from those who decline consent on a number of 
important  demographic  and  socio-economic  variables, 
hence potentially introducing bias in the results [8]; and 
consent requirements increase the cost of, and time for, 
conducting  the  research.  Furthermore,  often  it  is  not 
practical to obtain individual patient consent because of 
the very large populations involved, the lack of a relation-
ship between the researchers and the patients, and the 
time  elapsed  between  data  collection  and  the  research 
study.
One approach to facilitate the disclosure of information 
for  the  purposes  of  genomic  research,  and  to  alleviate 
some  of  the  problems  documented  above,  is  to  de-
identify data before disclosure to researchers or at the 
earliest  opportunity  afterwards  [9,10].  Many  research 
ethics boards will waive the consent requirement if the 
first ‘use’ of the data is to de-identify it [11,12].
The i2b2 project (informatics for integration of biology 
and the bedside) has developed tools for clinical investi-
gators to integrate medical records and clinical research. 
A query tool in i2b2 allows the computation of cohort 
sizes in a privacy protective way, and a data export tool 
allows  the  extraction  of  de-identified  individual-level 
data [13,14]. Also, the eMerge network, which consists of 
five sites in the United States, is an example of integrated 
EHR  and  genetic  databases  [3].  The  BioVU  system  at 
Vanderbilt University, a member of the eMerge network, 
links  a  biobank  of  discarded  blood  samples  with  EHR 
data, and information is disclosed for research purposes 
after de-identification [3,15].
Here, I provide a description and critical analysis of de-
identification methods that have been used in genomic 
research projects, such as i2b2 and eMerge. This is aug-
mented with an overview of contemporary standards, best 
practices and recent de-identification methodologies.
De-identification: definitions and concepts
A database integrating clinical information from an EHR 
with  a  DNA  repository  is  referred  to  here  as  a  trans-
lational research information system (TRIS) for brevity 
[16]. It is assumed that the data custodian is extracting a 
particular set of variables on patients from a TRIS and 
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and that the data custodian will be performing the de-
identification  before  the  disclosure  or  at  the  earliest 
opportunity  after  disclosure.  The  concern  for  the  data 
custodian  is  the  risk  that  an  adversary  will  try  to  re-
identify the disclosed data.
Identity versus attribute disclosure
There  are  two  kinds  of  re-identification  that  are  of 
concern.  The  first  is  when  an  adversary  can  assign  an 
identity to a record in the data disclosed from the TRIS. 
For example, the adversary would be able to determine 
that record number 7 belongs to a patient named ‘Alice 
Smith’. This is called identity disclosure. The second type 
of disclosure is when an adversary learns something new 
about a patient in the disclosed data without knowing 
which  specific  record  belongs  to  that  patient.  For 
example, if all 20-year-old female patients in the disclosed 
data who live in Ontario had a specific diagnosis, then an 
adversary does not need to know which record belongs to 
Alice Smith; if she is 20 years old and lives in Ontario 
then  the  adversary  will  discover  something  new  about 
her: the diagnosis. This is called attribute disclosure.
All the publicly known examples of re-identification of 
personal  information  have  involved  identity  disclosure 
[17-26].  Therefore,  the  focus  is  on  identity  disclosure 
because it is the type that is known to have occurred in 
practice.
Types of variable
The data in an EHR will include clinical information, and 
possibly socio-economic status information that may be 
collected from patients or linked in from external sources 
(such  as  the  census).  EHR  information  can  be  divided 
into four categories. The distinctions among these cate-
gories are important because they have an impact on the 
probability  of  re-identification  and  on  suitable  de-
identification methods.
Directly identifying information
One or more direct identifiers can be used to uniquely 
identify an individual, either by themselves or in combi-
nation  with  other  readily  available  information.  For 
example, there are more than 200 people named ‘John 
Smith’ in Ontario, and therefore the name by itself would 
not be directly identifying, but in combination with the 
address  it  would  be  directly  identifying  information. 
Examples  of  directly  identifying  information  include 
email address, health insurance card number, credit card 
number, and social insurance number.
Indirectly identifying relational information
Relational  information  can  be  used  to  probabilistically 
identify  an  individual.  General  examples  include  sex, 
geographic  indicators  (such  as  postal  codes,  census 
geography, or information about proximity to known or 
unique  landmarks),  and  event  dates  (such  as  birth, 
admission, discharge, procedure, death, specimen collec-
tion, or visit/encounter).
Indirectly identifying transactional information
This is similar to relational information in that it can be 
used to probabilistically identify an individual. However, 
transactional information may have many instances per 
individual and per visit. For example, diagnosis codes and 
drugs  dispensed  would  be  considered  transactional 
information.
Sensitive information
This  is  information  that  is  rarely  useful  for  re-identi-
fication purposes - for example, laboratory results.
For any piece of information, its classification into one 
of the above categories will be context dependant.
Relational and transactional information are referred to 
as  quasi-identifiers.  The  quasi-identifiers  represent  the 
background  knowledge  about  individuals  in  the  TRIS 
that  can  be  used  by  an  adversary  for  re-identification. 
Without this background knowledge identity disclosure 
cannot  occur.  For  example,  if  an  adversary  knows  an 
individual’s date of birth and postal code, then s/he can 
re-identify matching records in the disclosed data. If the 
adversary  does  not  have  such  background  knowledge 
about a person, then a date of birth and postal code in a 
database would not reveal the person’s identity. Further-
more, because physical attributes and certain diagnoses 
can be inferred from DNA analysis (for example, gender, 
blood type, approximate skin pigmentation, a diagnosis 
of  cystic  fibrosis  or  Huntington’s  chorea),  the  DNA 
sequence data of patients known to an adversary can be 
used  for  phenotype  prediction  and  subsequent  re-
identification of clinical records [27-29]. If an adversary 
has an identified DNA sequence of a target individual, 
this can be used to match and re-identify a sequence in 
the repository. Without an identified DNA sequence or 
reference  sample  as  background  knowledge,  such  an 
approach for re-identification would not work [16]. The 
manner  and  ease  with  which  an  adversary  can  obtain 
such background knowledge will determine the plausible 
methods of re-identification for a particular dataset.
Text versus structured data
Another way to consider the data in a TRIS is in terms of 
representation:  structured  versus  free-form  text.  Some 
data elements in EHRs are in a structured format, which 
means  that  they  have  a  pre-defined  data  type  and 
semantics (for example, a date of birth or a postal code). 
There will also be plenty of free-form text in the form of, 
for  example,  discharge  summaries,  pathology  reports, 
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process has to deal with both types of data. The BioVU 
and i2b2 projects have developed and adapted tools for 
the de-identification of free-form text [15,30].
De-identification standards
In the US, the Health Insurance Portability and Account-
ability  Act  (HIPAA)  Privacy  Rule  provides  three  stan-
dards  for  the  disclosure  of  health  information  without 
seeking patient authorization: the Safe Harbor standard 
(henceforth Safe Harbor), the Limited Dataset, and the 
statistical standard. Safe Harbor is a precise standard for 
the de-identification of personal health information when 
disclosed  for  secondary  purposes.  It  stipulates  the 
removal of 18 variables from a dataset as summarized in 
Box 1. The Limited Dataset stipulates the removal of only 
16 variables, but also requires that the data recipient sign 
a data sharing agreement with the data custodian. The 
statistical standard requires an expert to certify that ‘the 
risk  is  very  small  that  the  information  could  be  used, 
alone or in combination with other reasonably available 
information,  by  an  anticipated  recipient  to  identify  an 
individual  who  is  a  subject  of  the  information’.  Out  of 
these three standards, the certainty and simplicity of Safe 
Harbor has made it attractive for data custodians.
Safe  Harbor  is  also  relevant  beyond  the  US.  For 
example, health research organizations and commercial 
organizations in Canada choose to use the Safe Harbor 
criteria  to  de-identify  datasets  [31,32],  Canadian  sites 
conducting  research  funded  by  US  agencies  need  to 
comply with HIPAA [33], and international guidelines for 
the public disclosure of clinical trials data have relied on 
Safe Harbor definitions [34].
However,  Safe  Harbor  has  a  number  of  important 
disadvantages. There is evidence that it can result in the 
excessive removal of information useful for research [35]. 
At the same time it does not provide sufficient protection 
for many types of data, as illustrated below.
First, it does not explicitly consider genetic data as part 
of the 18 fields to remove or generalize. There is evidence 
that a sequence of 30 to 80 independent single nucleotide 
polymorphisms (SNPs) could uniquely identify a single 
person [36]. There is also a risk of re-identification from 
pooled data, where it is possible to determine whether an 
individual is in a pool of several thousand SNPs using 
summary  statistics  on  the  proportion  of  individuals  in 
the  case  or  control  group  and  the  corresponding  SNP 
value [37,38].
Second,  Safe  Harbor  does  not  consider  longitudinal 
data.  Longitudinal  data  contain  information  about 
multiple visits or episodes of care. For example, let us 
consider  the  state  inpatient  database  for  California  for 
the year 2007, which contains information on 2,098,578 
patients. A Safe Harbor compliant dataset consisting only 
of the quasi-identifiers gender, year of birth, and year of 
admission has less than 0.03% of the records with a high 
probability of re-identification. A high probability of re-
identification is defined as over 0.2. However, with two 
more  longitudinal  variables  added,  length  of  stay  and 
time  since  last  visit  for  each  visit,  then  16.57%  of  the 
records  have  a  high  probability  of  re-identification 
(unpublished  observations).  Thus,  the  second  dataset 
also meets the Safe Harbor definition but has a markedly 
Box 1. The 18 elements in the HIPAA Privacy Rule Safe 
Harbor standard that must be excluded/removed from 
a dataset
The following identifiers of the individual or of relatives, 
employers, or household members of the individual, are 
removed:
1.  Names;
2.  All geographic subdivisions smaller than a State, including 
street address, city, county, precinct, zip code, and their 
equivalent geocodes, except for the initial three digits of a 
zip code if, according to the current publicly available data 
from the Bureau of the Census:
a)  The geographic unit formed by combining all zip codes 
with the same three initial digits contains more than 20,000 
people; and
b)  The initial three digits of a zip code for all such geographic 
units containing 20,000 or fewer people is changed to 000.
3.  All elements of dates (except year) for dates directly related 
to an individual, including birth date, admission date, 
discharge date, date of death; and all ages over 89 and all 
elements of dates (including year) indicative of such age, 
except that such ages and elements may be aggregated into 
a single category of age 90 or older;
4.  Telephone numbers;
5.  Fax numbers;
6.  Electronic mail addresses;
7.  Social security numbers;
8.  Medical record numbers;
9.  Health plan beneficiary numbers;
10.  Account numbers;
11.  Certificate/license numbers;
12.  Vehicle identifiers and serial numbers, including license plate 
numbers;
13.  Device identifiers and serial numbers;
14.  Web Universal Resource Locators (URLs);
15.  Internet Protocol (IP) address numbers;
16.  Biometric identifiers, including finger and voice prints;
17.  Full face photographic images and any comparable images; 
and
18.  Any other unique identifying number, characteristic, or code.
Adapted from [87]
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identification.  Therefore,  Safe  Harbor  does  not  ensure 
that the data are adequately de-identified. Longitudinal 
information, such as length of stay and time since last 
visit, may be known by neighbors, co-workers, relatives, 
and ex-spouses, and even the public for famous people.
Third,  Safe  Harbor  does  not  deal  with  transactional 
data.  For  example,  it  has  been  shown  that  a  series  of 
diagnosis codes (International Statistical Classification of 
Diseases  and  Related  Health  Problems)  for  patients 
makes a large percentage of individuals uniquely identi  fi-
able [39]. An adversary who is employed by the health-
care provider could have access to the diagnosis codes 
and  patient  identity,  which  can  be  used  to  re-identify 
records disclosed from the TRIS.
Fourth,  Safe  Harbor  does  not  take  into  account  the 
sampling fraction - it is well established that sub-samp  ling 
can reduce the probability of re-identification [40-46]. For 
example,  consider  a  cohort  of  63,796  births  in  Ontario 
over  2004  to  2009  and  three  quasi-identifiers:  maternal 
postal  code,  date  of  birth  of  baby,  and  mother’s  age. 
Approximately 96% of the records were unique on these 
three  quasi-identifiers,  making  them  highly  identi  fi  able. 
For  research  purposes,  this  dataset  was  de-identified  to 
ensure that 5% or less of the records could be correctly re-
identified by reducing the precision of the postal code to 
the first three characters, and the date of birth to year of 
birth. However, a cohort of 127,592 births de-identified in 
exactly  the  same  way  could  have  10%  of  its  records 
correctly  re-identified.  In  this  case  the  variables  were 
exactly  the  same  in  the  two  cohorts  but,  because  the 
sampling  fraction  varies,  the  percentage  of  records  that 
can be re-identified doubles (from 5% to 10%, respectively).
Finally, other pieces of information that can re-identify 
individuals in free-form text and notes are not accounted 
for in Safe Harbor. The following example illustrates how 
I used this information to re-identify a patient. In a series 
of medical records that have been de-identified using the 
Safe Harbor standard, there was a record about a patient 
with a specific injury. The notes mentioned the profession 
of the patient’s father and hinted at the location of his 
work.  This  particular  profession  lists  its  members 
publicly.  It  was  therefore  possible  to  identify  all  indi-
viduals  within  that  profession  in  that  region.  Searches 
through social networking sites allowed the identification 
of a matching patient (having the same surname) with 
details of the specific injury during that specific period. 
The key pieces of information that made re-identification 
possible were the father’s profession and region of work, 
and these are not part of the Safe Harbor items.
Therefore,  universal  de-identification  heuristics  that 
pro  scribe certain fields or prescribe specific generali  za-
tions of fields will not provide adequate protection in all 
situations and must be used with caution. Both the BioVU 
[15] and the i2b2 project [13] de-identify individual-level 
data  according  to  the  Safe  Harbor  standard,  but  also 
require a data sharing agreement with the data recipients 
as required by the Limited Dataset provision, and some 
sites  implementing  the  i2b2  software  use  the  Limited 
Dataset provision for de-identification [14].
Although  the  Limited  Dataset  provision  provides  a 
mechanism to disclose information without consent, it 
does  not  produce  data  that  are  de-identified.  The 
challenge  for  data  custodians  is  that  the  notices  to 
patients for some repositories state that the data will be 
de-identified,  so  there  is  an  obligation  to  perform  de-
identification before disclosure [15,47]. Where patients 
are approached in advance for consent to include their 
data in the repository, this is predicated on the under-
standing that any disclosures will be of de-identified data 
[3]. Under these circumstances, a more stringent standard 
than the Limited Dataset is required. Within the frame-
work of HIPAA, one can then use the statistical standard 
for  de-identification.  This  is  consistent  with  privacy 
legislation and regulations in other jurisdictions, which 
tend  not  to  be  prescriptive  and  allow  a  more  context-
dependant interpretation of identifiability [26].
Managing re-identification risk
The  statistical  standard  in  the  HIPAA  Privacy  Rule 
provides a means to disclose more detailed information 
for research purposes and still manage overall re-identifi-
cation risk. Statistical methods can provide quantitative 
guarantees to patients and research ethics boards that the 
probability of re-identification is low.
A risk-based approach has been in use for a few years 
for  the  disclosure  of  large  clinical  and  administrative 
datasets [48], and can be similarly used for the disclosure 
of  information  from  a  TRIS.  The  basic  principles  of  a 
risk-based approach for de-identification are that (a) a re-
identification probability threshold should be set and (b) 
the  data  should  be  de-identified  until  the  actual  re-
identification probability is below that threshold.
Because  measurement  is  necessary  for  setting  thres-
holds, the supplementary material (Additional file 1) con-
sists of a detailed review of re-identification probability 
metrics  for  evaluating  identity  disclosure.  Below  is  a 
description of how to set a threshold and an overview of 
de-identification methods that can be used.
Setting a threshold
There are two general approaches to setting a threshold: 
(a) based on precedent and (b) based on an assessment of 
the risks from the disclosure of data.
Precedents for thresholds
Historically, data custodians have used the ‘cell size of 
five’ rule to de-identify data [49-58]. In the context of a 
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lent to a probability of 0.2. Some custodians use a cell size 
of 3 [59-62], which is equivalent to a probability of 0.33 of 
re-identifying  a  single  individual.  Such  thresholds  are 
suitable when the data recipient is trusted.
It  has  been  estimated  that  the  Safe  Harbor  standard 
results in 0.04% of the population being at high risk for 
re-identification [63,64]. Another re-identification attack 
study evaluated the proportion of Safe Harbor compliant 
medical records that can be re-identified and found that 
only 0.01% can be correctly re-identified [65]. In practice, 
setting such low thresholds can also result in significant 
distortion to the data [35], and is arguably more suitable 
when data are being publicly disclosed.
Risk-based thresholds
With  this  approach,  the  re-identification  probability 
threshold is determined based on factors characterizing 
the data recipient and the data [48]. These factors have 
been suggested and have been in use informally by data 
custodians  to  inform  their  disclosure  decisions  for  at 
least the last decade and a half [46,66], and they cover 
three dimensions [67], as follows.
First, mitigating controls: this is the set of security and 
privacy practices that the data recipient has in place. The 
practices  used  by  custodians  of  large  datasets  and 
recommended by funding agencies and research ethics 
boards  for  managing  sensitive  health  information  have 
been reviewed elsewhere [68].
Second, invasion of privacy: this evaluates the extent to 
which  a  particular  disclosure  would  be  an  invasion  of 
privacy to the patients (a checklist is available in [67]). 
There are three considerations: (i) the sensitivity of the 
data: the greater the sensitivity of the data, the greater the 
invasion of privacy; (ii) the potential injury to patients 
from  an  inappropriate  disclosure  -  the  greater  the 
potential for injury, the greater the invasion of privacy; 
and (iii) the appropriateness of consent for disclosing the 
data - the less appropriate the consent, the greater the 
potential invasion of privacy.
Third, motives and capacity: this considers the motives 
and the capacity of the data recipient to re-identify the 
data, considering issues such as conflicts of interest, the 
potential for financial gain from a re-identification, and 
whether the data recipient has the skills and the necessary 
resources to re-identify the data (a checklist is available 
in [67]).
For example, if the mitigating controls are low, which 
means  that  the  data  recipient  has  poor  security  and 
privacy  practices,  then  the  re-identification  threshold 
should be set at a lower level. This will result in more de-
identification  being  applied.  However,  if  the  data 
recipient has very good security and privacy practices in 
place, then the threshold can be set higher.
De-identification methods
The  i2b2  project  tools  allow  investigators  to  query  for 
patients  and  controls  that  meet  specific  inclusion/
exclusion criteria [13,69]. This allows the investigator to 
determine  the  size  of  cohorts  for  a  study.  The  queries 
return counts of unique patients that match the criteria. 
If few patients match the criteria, however, there is a high 
probability of re-identification. To protect against such 
identity  disclosure,  the  query  engine  performs  several 
functions.  First,  random  noise  from  a  Gaussian  distri-
bution  is  added  to  returned  counts,  and  the  standard 
deviation of the distribution is increased as true counts 
approach zero. Second, an audit trail is maintained and if 
users  are  running  too  many  related  queries  they  are 
blocked. Also, limits are imposed on multiple queries so 
that a user cannot compute the mean of the perturbed 
data.
The disclosure of individual-level data from a TRIS is 
also  important,  and  various  de-identification  methods 
can  be  applied  to  such  data.  The  de-identification 
methods  that  have  the  most  acceptability  among  data 
recipients are masking, generalization, and suppression 
(see  below).  Other  methods,  such  as  the  addition  of 
random noise, distort the individual-level data in ways 
that  are  sometimes  not  intuitive  and  may  result  in 
incorrect  results  if  these  distortions  affect  the  multi-
variate  correlational  structure  in  the  data.  This  can  be 
mitigated  if  the  specific  type  of  analysis  that  will  be 
performed is known in advance and the distortions can 
account  for  that.  Nevertheless,  they  tend  to  have  low 
acceptance  among  health  researchers  and  analysts  [5], 
and certain types of random noise perturbation can be 
filtered out to recover the original data [70]; therefore, 
the  effectiveness  of  noise  addition  can  be  questioned. 
Furthermore, perturbing the DNA sequences themselves 
may  obscure  relationships  or  even  lead  to  false  asso-
ciations [71].
Methods  that  have  been  applied  in  practice  are 
described below and are summarized in Table 1.
Masking
Masking refers to a set of manipulations of the directly 
identifying  information  in  the  data.  In  general,  direct 
identifiers  are  removed/redacted  from  the  dataset, 
replaced with random values, or replaced with a unique 
key  (also  called  pseudonymization)  [72].  This  latter 
approach  is  used  in  the  BioVU  project  to  mask  the 
medical record number using a hash function [15].
Patient  names  are  usually  redacted  or  replaced  with 
false  names  selected  randomly  from  name  lists  [73]. 
Numbers,  such  as  medical  record  numbers,  social 
security  numbers,  and  telephone  numbers,  are  either 
redacted or replaced with randomly generated but valid 
numbers [74]. Locations, such as the names of facilities, 
El Emam Genome Medicine 2011, 3:25 
http://genomemedicine.com/content/3/4/25
Page 5 of 9would  also  normally  be  redacted.  Such  data  mani  pu-
lations  are  relatively  simple  to  perform  for  structured 
data. Text de-identification tools will also do this, such as 
the tool used in the BioVU project [15].
Generalization
Generalization  reduces  the  precision  in  the  data.  As  a 
simple example of increasing generalization, a patient’s 
date of birth can be generalized to a month and year of 
birth, to a year of birth, or to a 5 year interval. Allowable 
generalizations can be specified a priori in the form of a 
generalization  hierarchy,  as  in  the  age  example  above. 
Generalizations  have  been  defined  for  SNP  sequences 
[75]  and  clinical  datasets  [68].  Instead  of  hierarchies, 
generalizations  can  also  be  constructed  empirically  by 
combining or clustering sequences [76] and transactional 
data [77] into more general groups.
When  a  dataset  is  generalized  the  re-identification 
probability can be measured afterwards. Records that are 
considered  high  risk  are  then  flagged  for  suppression. 
When there are many variables the number of possible 
ways that these variables can be generalized can be large. 
Generalization algorithms are therefore used to find the 
best method of generalization. The algorithms are often 
constrained by a value MaxSup, which is the maximum 
percentage  of  records  in  the  dataset  that  can  be 
suppressed. For example, if MaxSup is set to 5%, then the 
generalization algorithm will ignore all possible generali-
zations that will result in more than 5% of the records 
being  flagged  for  suppression.  This  will  also  guarantee 
that  no  more  than  5%  of  the  records  will  have  any 
suppression in them.
Generalization is an optimization problem whereby the 
algorithm tries to find the optimal generalization for each 
of the quasi-identifiers that will ensure that the proba-
bility  of  re-identification  is  at  or  below  the  required 
threshold,  the  percentage  of  records  flagged  for 
suppression  is  below  MaxSup,  and  information  loss  is 
minimized.
Information  loss  is  used  to  measure  the  amount  of 
distortion to the data. A simple measure of information 
loss is how high up the hierarchy the chosen generali-
zation level is. However, this creates difficulties of inter-
pretation, and other more theoretically grounded metrics 
that  take  into  account  the  difference  in  the  level  of 
precision between the original dataset and the general-
ized data have been suggested [5].
Suppression
Usually suppression is applied to the specific records that 
are  flagged  for  suppression.  Suppression  means  the 
removal of values from the data. There are three general 
approaches  to  suppression:  casewise  deletion,  quasi-
identifier removal, and local cell suppression.
Casewise deletion removes the whole patient or visit 
record  from  the  dataset.  This  results  in  the  most 
distortion to the data because the sensitive variables are 
also removed even though those do not contribute to an 
increase in the risk of identity disclosure.
Quasi-identifier removal removes only the values about 
the quasi-identifiers in the dataset. This has the advantage 
that all of the sensitive information is retained.
Local cell suppression is an improvement over quasi-
identifier  removal  in  that  fewer  values  are  suppressed. 
Local cell suppression applies an optimization algorithm 
to  find  the  least  number  of  values  about  the  quasi-
identifiers to suppress [78]. All of the sensitive variables 
are  retained  and  in  practice  considerably  fewer  of  the 
quasi-identifier  values  are  suppressed  than  in  casewise 
and quasi-identifier deletion.
Available tools
Recent  reports  have  provided  summaries  of  free  and 
supported commercial tools for the de-identification of 
Table 1. Summary of de-identification methods for individual-level data
De-identification method  Techniques  Details
Masking (applied to direct identifiers)  Suppression/redaction  Direct identifiers are removed from the data or replaced with tags
  Random replacement/randomization  Direct identifiers are replaced with randomly chosen values  
    (for example, for names and medical record numbers)
  Pseudonymization  Unique numbers that are not reversible replace direct identifiers
Generalization (applied to quasi-identifiers)  Hierarchy-based generalization  Generalization is based on a predefined hierarchy describing how  
    precision on quasi-identifiers is reduced
  Cluster-based generalization  Individual transactions are empirically grouped or based on pre- 
    defined utility policies
Suppression (applied to records   Casewise deletion  The full record is deleted 
flagged for suppression) 
  Quasi-identifier deletion  Only the quasi-identifiers are deleted
  Local cell suppression  Optimization scheme is applied to the quasi-identifiers to  
    suppress the fewest values but ensure a re-identification  
    probability below the threshold
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Also,  various  text  de-identification  tools  have  recently 
been  reviewed  [81],  although  many  of  these  tools  are 
experimental and may not all be readily available. Tools 
for the de-identification of genomic data are mostly at the 
research stage and their general availability and level of 
support is unknown.
Conclusions
Genomic research is increasingly using clinically relevant 
data  from  electronic  health  records.  Research  ethics 
boards  will  often  require  patient  consent  when  their 
information is used for secondary purposes, unless that 
information is de-identified. I have described above the 
methods  and  challenges  of  de-identifying  data  when 
disclosed for such research.
Combined  genomic  and  clinical  data  can  be  quite 
complex, with free form textual or structured represen  ta-
tions, as well as clinical data that are cross-sectional or 
longitudinal,  and  relational  or  transactional.  I  have 
described  current  de-identification  practices  in  two 
genomic research projects, i2b2 and BioVU, as well as 
more  recent  best  practices  for  managing  the  risk  of 
re-identification.
It is easiest to use prescriptive de-identification heur-
istics  such  as  those  in  the  HIPAA  Privacy  Rule  Safe 
Harbor  standard.  However,  such  a  standard  provides 
insufficient protection for the complex datasets referred 
to here and may result in the disclosure of data with a 
high  probability  of  re-identification.  Even  when  aug-
mented with data sharing agreements, these agreements 
may be based on the inaccurate assumption that the data 
have a low probability of re-identification. Furthermore, 
notices to patients and consent forms often state that the 
data  will  be  de-identified  when  disclosed.  Disclosure 
practices that are based on the actual measurement of the 
probability of re-identification allow data custodians to 
better manage their legal obligations and commitments 
to patients.
Moving  forward,  several  areas  will  require  further 
research  to  minimize  risks  of  re-identification  of  data 
used  for  genomic  research.  For  example,  improved 
methods for the de-identification of genome sequences 
or genomic data are needed. Sequence de-identification 
methods  that  rely  on  generalization  that  have  been 
proposed  thus  far  will  likely  result  in  significant 
distortions to large datasets [82]. There is also evidence 
that the simple suppression of the sequence for specific 
genes  can  be  undone  relatively  accurately  [83].  In 
addition,  the  re-identification  risks  to  family  members 
have  not  been  considered  here.  Although  various  re-
identification  attacks  have  been  highlighted  [84-86], 
adequate familial de-identification methods have yet to 
be developed.
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